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Abstract: The 1995 model of Bonabeau et al is generalized by giving each
individual a different ability to win or lose a fight. We also introduce different
groups such that the losers of fights between different groups are eliminated.
The overall phase diagram for the first-order transition between egalitarian
and hierarchical societies does not change much by these generalizations.
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1 Introduction
The model of Bonabeau et al [1] described how a difference between powerful
and powerless levels of society can self-organize out of randomness and the
memory of past power fights. With suitable modifications [2] a first-order
phase transition was found: at low concentrations the society remained egal-
itarian, while at high concentrations some individuals became ”more equal”
than others. These inequalities are measured by the probability to win the
fights arising whenever one individual wants to move onto the place occupied
by another; initially we have an egalitarian society where everybody has the
winning probability 1/2. As in some biological species [3], the individuals
1
keep a memory of past fights such that past victories re-inforce the probabil-
ity to win again. The present note makes the individuals unequal from the
beginning and checks how this modification changes the results.
2 Old Model
A L × L square lattice is filled randomly with N = pL2 individuals such
that no two or more share one site. Then they diffuse randomly to nearest-
neighbour sites. If one individual i wants to occupy the site on which already
another individual k sits, a fight breaks out which is won by one of the two,
who then moves into the contested site; the loser instead moves into the site
previously occupied by the winner. The probability for i to win is
q = 1/[1 + exp(σ · (h(k)− h(i))]
where h(i) is the number of past victories minus the number of past losses
of i except that at each time step all h are diminished by a factor 1− f ; this
memory factor f , which is the same for all individuals, indicates how fast
past events are forgotten. The inequality σ is the standard deviation in the
probabilities q:
σ2 =< q2 > − < q >2 ;
during the first 10 iterations we set σ = 1. With this feedback through σ a
sharp first-order phase transition (discontinuity) was found [2] near p = 0.32
for f = 0.1: For higher concentrations p a non-zero social inequality σ was
obtained while for lower p this σ vanished to zero.
3 New Models
First we gave each individual i different histories h(i) to start with; then
initially the preferred individuals for low concentrations could enlarge their
advantage but after some time they lost it and no correlations were seen
between initial and final h (not shown).
Second, we gave each individual different abilities to win a fight by re-
placing h(i) with h(i) + a(i)z where z is a random number between 0 and
1, evaluated for each fight and each i again and again, while the ability
a(i) stays with each individual i forever and is initially distributed randomly
between −5 and +5. (Setting z = 1 does not change much.)
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Figure 1: Search for phase transition with permanent random abilities, at f =
0.1. For the more complicated models discussed later the order parameter
did not always go to unity if σ → 0, and thus σ which gave similar figures
was used as a criterion.
Third, we divided the whole population into G groups, initially equally
large. If two individuals of the same group fight, the above rules apply; if
two individuals of different groups fight, the loser vanishes and is replaced by
a replica of the winner with the same h and a; thus the winner is duplicated
and occupies both sites [4].
Fourth, a feedback [5] for the special case G = 2 is introduced such that
the majority wins more easily than the minority. Thus the above h(i)+a(i)z
is replaced by h(i) + [a(i) + 10m]z where m with −1 < m < +1 is the
magnetization, i.e. the normalized difference (N1 − N2)/(N1 +N2) between
the numbers N1, N2 of individuals in the two groups.
The similarity between the final power h(i)+a(i) and its initial value a(i)
is given by the order parameter
Ψ ∝
∑
i
[h(i) + a(i)]a(i)
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Order parameter (+) and inequality (x) versus p for 1001 x 1001 and 5001 x 5001
Figure 2: Stationary values for order parameter and inequality, from simula-
tions like in Fig.1, using medium and large lattices.
which we normalize to unity at the beginning.
4 Results
Usually we made up to 5000 iterations with up to about 5000×5000 sites. For
the second model, Fig.1 shows how the order parameter initially increases
due to re-inforcement of individuals with higher abilities. However, if the
concentration is low such that fights occur seldomly, then the positive effects
of these abilities are mostly forgotten until the next fight, and everybody has
the same chance of 1/2 to win or lose. This happens for the 8 leftmost curves,
p = 0.10, 0.11, . . . , 0.17, in Fig.1. For p = 0.18 the system needs a long time
to find this egalitarian state. For p = 0.19 and 0.20 we see two plateaus
in the later times, with no indication of a decay. With additional runs at
p = 0.181, 0.182, . . . and 5000 iterations we found a stable order paraneter
Ψ > 1 and inequality σ > 0 only at p ≥ 0.182. Fig.2 shows the long-time
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Phase diagram: Hierarchical (upper left) versus egalitarian (Lower right) societies; 5001 x 5001
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Two-groups phase diagram: 4001 x 4001, with (right) and without (left) different abilities
Figure 3: Phase diagram with one group (part a) and two groups (part b);
in the latter case also the results without different abilities are shown.
values of Ψ and σ, indicating a jump (first-order transition) of both quantities
near p = 0.182. All these simulations were made with the traditional value
f = 0.1.
Varying the memory factor f we find the phase diagram of Fig.3a; for
f > 1/3 the model always leads to egalitarian results since past fights are
forgotten too fast. Fig.3b shows the analogous phase diagram in the third
model with two groups, also for the case without different abilities.
With five groups, Fig.4 shows a behaviour similar to one or two groups,
Fig.3. We also give here as the lower data the results for the standard model
[2] without different abilities and only one group; again, the behaviour seems
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Phase diagram: standard (x,L = 5001) and five groups (+, L = 4001); egalitarian in lower right
Figure 4: Phase diagram for five groups (+); the x indicate the standard
model without different groups and without different abilities.
similar. Thus for all models except the fourth one the results are similar:
The transition line starts at the origin and increases roughly linearly to a
fully occupied lattice, p = 1, at a memory decay factor between 1/5 and 1/3;
for larger f (shorter memory) the society remains egalitarian.
In the fourth model with feedback the concept of a transition is less
clear. The larger the lattice is, the smaller is the normalized fluctuating
magnetization m appearing in h(i)+ [a(i)+10m]z and the higher is the crit-
ical concentration at which the egalitarian society is destroyed. The earlier
transition points were determined by gradually increasing p, Fig.1; in the
feedback version, however, it happened that when at some p the inequality
σ went to zero, at some slightly higher p it became nonzero, and then zero
again for still higher p. In that case, for large L = 4001 and one sample
only, some intermediate p value was taken as transition point. For smaller
101 ≤ L ≤ 1001, hundred samples were simulated and the transition point
defined as the concentration p where about 50 samples ended with σ = 0
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Size dependence with feedback for memory factors 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 (bottom to top)
Figure 5: Size effects in the feedback model, indicating a roughly logarithmic
increase of the transition p with L.
and the others with nonzero σ. Fig.5 shows an increase of the transition
p roughly logarithmic in system size; and for infinite system size the whole
feedback effect as simulated here would vanish and the results agree with
those of Fig.3b.
We thank D. Sornette for suggesting to put individual differences into the
Bonabeau model.
7
References
[1] E. Bonabeau, G. Theraulaz, J.L. Deneubourg, Physica A 217, 373
(1995).
[2] D. Stauffer, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 14, 237 (2003).
[3] F. Gherardi, W.H. Daniels, Can. J. Zool. 81, 1269 (2003).
[4] S. Ispolatov, P.L. Krapivsky and S. Redner, Phys. Rev. E 54, 1274
(1996).
[5] S. Bornholdt, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 12, 667 (2001).
8
